Erroneous Deviation or Faithful Restoration? An Examination of the NLRB’s Browning-Ferris Joint-Employer Standard by Kortokrax, Stephanie A.
Erroneous Deviation or Faithful Restoration? An 
Examination of the NLRB’s Browning-Ferris 
Joint-Employer Standard 
STEPHANIE A. KORTOKRAX* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 228 
II. THE BROWNING-FERRIS DECISION: PROPOSED POLICY AND  
 LEGAL SUPPORT ........................................................................... 232 
A. The Facts of the Case ............................................................ 232 
B. The NLRB Announces a New Joint-Employer Standard ...... 233 
C. The Dissent: An Impermissible Departure from  
 Common Law Principles ....................................................... 236 
III. TRADITIONAL JUDICIAL REVIEW OF NLRB DECISIONS ............... 238 
A. The Development of the Chevron Deference Doctrine ......... 238 
B. Limits of Chevron Deference to the NLRB ........................... 242 
IV. THE PURPOSE AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NLRA ........... 244 
V. COURTS SHOULD DEFER TO THE BROWNING-FERRIS  
 JOINT-EMPLOYER STANDARD ...................................................... 246 
A. The Browning-Ferris Joint-Employer Standard Is  
 Reasonably Consistent with Common Law Principles  
 of Agency ............................................................................... 247 
1. The Second and Third Restatements of Agency  
 Permit Finding an Employment Relationship  
 When a Putative Employer Possesses Only  
 Indirect or Unexercised Control over Workers .............. 248 
2. A Broad, Flexible Understanding of the Common  
 Law Is Consistent with the Purposes of the NLRA ......... 251 
B. The Browning-Ferris Joint-Employer Standard Is  
 Different than the Economic Realities Test .......................... 253 
C. The Browning-Ferris Standard Involves a Case-by-Case 
Analysis that Will Not Necessarily Result in Any  
 Dramatic or Unjustified Economic Implications .................. 255 
VI. CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 257 
228 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78:1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),1 the 
industrial and economic landscape in the United States has fundamentally 
transformed.2 Gone are the days of simple, direct, and one-layered 
employment relationships. In their place, businesses have increasingly come to 
rely on a variety of “contingent work” arrangements,3 including temporary 
workers, project workers, and subcontractors.4 These flexible, nonstandard 
employment relationships are attractive to business owners and management 
for several reasons. Contingent workers are typically compensated at 
significantly lower rates than their traditional, more permanent counterparts.5 
Tax, employment, and labor statutes also incentivize businesses to develop 
arms-length employment relationships to avoid legal obligations and 
correlating expenses.6 
The surge of contingent workers has been accompanied by a decline in 
union membership and the number of workers covered by labor and 
employment statutes.7 Many statutes apply outdated standards that have not 
developed to address current American workplace realities, leaving many 
workers unprotected.8 Because of this workplace transformation and the 
associated decline in job security and wage stability, many have urged 
administrative agencies such as the Department of Labor (DOL), Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and the National Labor 
                                                                                                                     
 * J.D. Candidate, 2017, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law. I would 
like to thank Professor Camille Hébert for her valuable feedback on previous drafts of this 
Note as well as the Ohio State Law Journal staff for the time and effort expended in 
bringing this Note to publication, especially Sara Skwiertz. A special thanks also goes to 
my mother, Cindy Kortokrax, for her constant patience, love, and support. 
 1 National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), amended by 
Labor Management Relations (Taft–Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401–531 (2012)). Subsequently, these enactments will 
collectively be referred to as the “NLRA.” 
 2 See Contingent Workers, U.S. DEP’T LAB., https://www.dol.gov/_sec/media/repor 
ts/dunlop/section5.htm [https://perma.cc/C2GR-EY3T]. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Charles Wilbanks, Temp Work Raises Long-Term Questions for Economy, CBS 
MONEYWATCH (Mar. 7, 2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/temp-work-raises-long-
term-questions-for-economy/ [https://perma.cc/KF3E-BAU4]. Although the data can vary 
depending on how “contingent work” is defined, recent Department of Labor “data 
suggest[s] that roughly a third, and perhaps up to 40 percent, of American workers are in 
part-time, contract or other non-standard jobs.” Id. Sources estimate that there will be up to 
23 million contingent workers by 2017, up from about 17 million in 2013. Id. 
 5 Contingent Workers, supra note 2. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Wilbanks, supra note 4. 
 8 See Contingent Workers, supra note 2. 
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Relations Board (NLRB or Board) to update their policies to better effectuate 
the purposes of their founding statutes.9 
Perhaps in response to these pressures, the NLRB recently reevaluated its 
thirty-year-old standard for determining whether a joint-employer relationship 
exists between employees and multiple putative employers.10 The Board’s 
prior standard required that a joint employer’s control be “direct and 
immediate,” rather than “limited and routine.”11 The putative joint employer 
was required to have actually exercised control over the employees at issue, 
rather than merely possessing the potential authority to exercise control over 
the employees.12 In Browning-Ferris, the Board found that this standard 
“significantly and unjustifiably narrow[ed] the circumstances where a joint-
employment relationship c[ould] be found.”13 Accordingly, the NLRB adopted 
a new, employee-friendly standard requiring a two-part determination: (1) 
whether an employment relationship exists under the common-law agency test 
and (2) “whether the putative joint employer possesses sufficient control over 
employees’ essential terms and conditions of employment to permit 
meaningful collective bargaining.”14  
Central to the controversy surrounding Browning-Ferris, the NLRB’s new 
standard requires only that an employer possess authority to control the terms 
and conditions of workers’ employment; the NLRB will no longer require that 
                                                                                                                     
 9 See, e.g., Michael C. Harper, Defining the Economic Relationship Appropriate for 
Collective Bargaining, 39 B.C. L. REV. 329, 346 (1998) (“The use of employee leasing 
agencies and the subcontracting of supervisory authority over workers has made vulnerable 
an increasing number of American workers to the denial of the core promise of the 
NLRA.”); Contingent Workers, supra note 2 (“The definition of employee in labor, 
employment, and tax law should be modernized, simplified, and 
standardized. . . . Congress and the NLRB should remove the incentives that now exist for 
firms to use variations in corporate form to avoid responsibility for the people who do their 
work.”). 
 10 Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, 2015 WL 5047768, at 
*1 (Aug. 27, 2015). A petition challenging this decision has been filed in the D.C. Circuit. 
See Brief of Petitioner/Cross Respondent 10–13, Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc. v. 
NLRB, Nos. 16-1028, 16-1063, 16-1064 (D.C. Cir. June 7, 2016) (summary of petitioner’s 
argument). Oral arguments were held as this Note was prepared for publication. For a 
discussion, see Vin Gurrieri, NLRB’s Joint Employer Test Comes Under Fire at DC Circ., 
LAW360 (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.law360.com/employment/articles/899890/nlrb-s-joint-
employer-test-comes-under-fire-at-dc-circ-?nl_pk=4dc47758-78cc-425a-96f6-ad13961fe9c9 
&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=employment [https://perm 
a.cc/GK5P-NV3J]. 
 11 Browning-Ferris, 2015 WL 5047768, at *17; see also, e.g., TLI, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 
798, 799 (1984), overruled by Browning-Ferris, 2015 WL 5047768; Laerco Transp., 269 
N.L.R.B. 324, 326 (1984), overruled by Browning-Ferris, 2015 WL 5047768. 
 12 Browning-Ferris, 2015 WL 5047768, at *2. 
 13 Id. The NLRB’s goal in revisiting its joint-employer standard was to better address 
developing issues in the current economy and to better effectuate the purposes of the 
NLRA. Id. 
 14 Id. 
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a putative joint employer actually exercise any authority over workers.15 
Because both direct and indirect employer-control satisfy the new standard,16 
the circumstances under which the Board could find a joint-employer 
relationship has substantially increased.17  
The dissenting NLRB members vigorously opposed the majority’s 
departure from long-established Board precedent, contending that the new 
standard extends “far beyond” the power Congress delegated to the Board 
under the NLRA and Taft–Hartley amendments.18 The dissent also highlighted 
concerns about the significant implications the new standard might have on the 
economy and business labor policies.19 
The dissenting NLRB members were not alone in their concerns. The 
business and legal community have vigorously opposed the NLRB’s new 
standard, arguing that “it w[ill] force companies to the bargaining 
table . . . [who] have little say over working conditions,” resulting in increased 
instability and uncertainty in employment and business relationships.20 
Companies might “find themselves dragged into labor disputes” despite the 
fact that the company reasonably believed it had freed itself from collective- 
bargaining obligations by entering into an arms-length contract with an outside 
employment firm.21 Business organizations are criticizing the decision as 
“another case of unwarranted government overreach that could stifle 
[economic] growth”22 and have a “devastating economic impact.”23 
                                                                                                                     
 15 Id. 
 16 Id.  
 17 See Daniel Fisher, Controversial NLRB Ruling Could End Contract Employment As 
We Know It, FORBES (Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2015/08/27 
/nlrb-declares-browning-ferris-a-joint-employer-whos-next/ [https://perma.cc/8PM7-
ABHW]. In support of its Browning-Ferris decision, the NLRB cited its “responsibility to 
adapt the [NLRA] to the changing patterns of industrial life.” Browning-Ferris, 2015 WL 
5047768, at *15 (quoting NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266 (1975)). 
 18 Browning-Ferris, 2015 WL 5047768, at *25 (Members Miscimarra & Johnson, 
dissenting). The dissent argued that the new standard departs from well-established 
common law principles of agency that both precedent and the legislative history of the 
NLRA require the Board follow when assessing employment relationships. Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Daniel Wiessner, Companies Liable for Labor Violations by Franchisees, U.S. 
Labor Board Says, WESTLAW J. EMP., Sept. 15, 2015, at *1, *1 (“The NLRB has totally 
upset the apple cart with respect to an understanding over accepted business risk . . . .” 
(quoting Michael Lotito, attorney, Littler Mendelson)); see also Fisher, supra note 17. 
 21 Fisher, supra note 17. 
 22 Cole Stangler, NLRB’s New Joint Employer Standard: Everything You Wanted to 
Know but Were Afraid to Ask, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2015), http://www.ibtimes.com/ 
nlrbs-new-joint-employer-standard-everything-you-wanted-know-were-afraid-ask-2075896 
[https://perma.cc/3FEJ-DVT9]. 
 23 Dave Jamieson, The Labor Ruling McDonald’s Has Been Dreading Just Became a 
Reality, HUFFINGTON POST (quoting Competitive Enterprise Institute, a libertarian think 
tank), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/the-federal-ruling-mcdonalds-has-dreaded-
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The NLRB’s Browning-Ferris decision has also ignited strong support 
from the labor community and union-supporters, which are praising the 
decision as an appropriate response to a quickly evolving economic and 
employment landscape.24 Supporters maintain that the new standard could 
make it “easier for unions and workers to win higher wages and better working 
conditions,”25 restoring corporate responsibility and worker rights in a 
“‘fissured’ economy.”26 
Concerned parties on both sides of the debate have recognized the 
significant issues raised by the potential impact of the NLRB’s new joint-
employer standard.27 Because other administrative agencies typically afford 
NLRB decisions some deference, the NLRB’s departure from its thirty-year-
old standard will likely also encourage developments in other areas of the 
law.28 Considering the substantial impact Browning-Ferris might have on the 
legal, business, and labor communities, commentators have contended that 
now might be an appropriate time for courts to rein in the NLRB with respect 
to its expansive exercise of rulemaking authority.29 
Despite these concerns, this Note argues that courts should defer to the 
NLRB’s Browning-Ferris joint-employer decision because Congress has 
delegated rulemaking authority to the NLRB that allows the Board some 
discretion in making employment relationship determinations. The standard is 
also consistent with common law principles of agency and effectuates the 
established purposes of the NLRA. In Part II, this Note will review Browning-
Ferris, analyzing the legal and policy considerations articulated by the 
majority and dissenting NLRB members. Next, Part III will examine the 
standard of review courts traditionally employ when reviewing NLRB 
                                                                                                                     
just-became-a-reality_55df39a1e4b029b3f1b1db3b [https://perma.cc/GA37-VG6V] (last 
updated Aug. 28, 2015). 
 24 Stangler, supra note 22. 
 25 Wiessner, supra note 20, at *1. 
 26 Jamieson, supra note 23. Other sources also argue that the new joint-employer 
standard might insulate franchises and smaller companies from liability for labor law 
violations that are the result of corporate policies rather than local decisions, increasing 
corporate responsibility. See Wiessner, supra note 20, at *2. 
 27 See Ben James, 4 Things to Know About the NLRB’s Joint-Employer Decision, 
LAW360 (Aug. 28, 2015), https://www.law360.com/employment/articles/696698/4-things-
to-know-about-the-nlrb-s-joint-employer-decision [https://perma.cc/3BPV-BNL5].  
 28 Perhaps of greatest concern is the impact Browning-Ferris might have on 
decisionmaking at the EEOC, potentially increasing employer liability under a wide range 
of employment statutes, including Title VII. See Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. et al., Jumping for 
Joint Employer: The EEOC Files Amicus Brief Supporting Broadened Definition of Joint 
Employer in High-Profile NLRB Litigation, SEYFARTH SHAW: WORKPLACE CLASS ACTION 
BLOG (Sept. 21, 2016), http://www.workplaceclassaction.com/2016/09/jumping-for-joint-
employer-the-eeoc-files-amicus-brief-supporting-broadened-definition-of-joint-employer-
in-high-profile-nlrb-litigation/ [https://perma.cc/K9QM-C8C9]. 
 29 James, supra note 27 (“We know the courts have sometimes reined in the agency, 
and this could be one of those times.” (quoting Steven Bernstein, partner, Fisher & Phillips 
LLP)). 
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decisions, including an assessment of when Chevron deference applies to 
NLRB decisions. Then, Part IV will analyze whether the NLRA’s purpose and 
legislative history provide any ambiguity as to what standard the NLRB must 
apply when assessing joint-employment status. Finally, Part V will argue that 
courts should defer to the Board’s decision because it is faithful to the 
purposes of the NLRA and reasonably consistent with the general common 
law of agency.  
II. THE BROWNING-FERRIS DECISION: PROPOSED POLICY AND LEGAL 
SUPPORT 
In Browning-Ferris, the NLRB reevaluated its thirty-year-old joint-
employer standard.30 After re-evaluating the NLRA’s purposes and traditional 
NLRB practices, the majority ultimately reconstructed its standard for 
determining joint-employment relationships.31 The majority expanded its 
standard to include those employers who merely possess indirect or 
unexercised control, as long as the employer “possesses sufficient control over 
employees’ essential terms and conditions of employment to permit 
meaningful collective bargaining.”32 The dissent opposed this departure from 
Board precedent, finding that the majority’s new standard overstepped the 
Board’s rulemaking authority because it was not based on the common law of 
agency, but rather the members’ own policy agenda.33 
A. The Facts of the Case 
Browning-Ferris Industries of California (BFI) owns and operates the 
Newby Island recycling facility.34 BFI is the sole employer of approximately 
sixty employees, most of whom work outside of the Newby Island recycling 
facility where they prepare materials that will be sorted inside the facility.35 
Once the materials are transported inside, workers provided by a staffing 
agency, Leadpoint, sort the materials and clean the facility.36 The relationship 
between BFI and the contingent workforce provided by Leadpoint is 
controlled by a temporary labor services agreement (Agreement).37 The 
Agreement explicitly states that “Leadpoint is the sole employer of the 
personnel it supplies” BFI and that “nothing in the Agreement shall be 
construed as creating an employment relationship between BFI and the 
                                                                                                                     
 30 Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, 2015 WL 5047768, at 
*1–2 (Aug. 27, 2015). 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. at *2. 
 33 Id. at *25 (Members Miscimarra & Johnson, dissenting). 
 34 Id. at *3 (majority opinion). 
 35 Id. 
 36 Browning-Ferris, 2015 WL 5047768, at *3. 
 37 Id. 
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personnel that Leadpoint supplies.”38 The Agreement also sets forth the terms 
and conditions of the relationship between BFI and the personnel provided by 
Leadpoint, including the management structure; hiring, discipline, and 
termination procedures; wages and benefits; the setting of personnel hours and 
schedule; the actual work performed; and training and safety requirements.39  
When the same union representing the sole employees of BFI filed a 
petition to also represent the Leadpoint employees in their bargaining with 
BFI, the Regional NLRB Director issued a Decision and Direction of Election 
finding that BFI was not a joint employer of the Leadpoint personnel working 
in the BFI facility.40 The union filed for NLRB review of this decision, 
contending that the terms as well as the realities of the relationship between 
Leadpoint and BFI were that of a joint-employment relationship under the 
Board’s standard.41 If not, the union argued, the NLRB should reconsider its 
standard for determining joint-employer relationships.42 The NLRB accepted 
this invitation.  
B. The NLRB Announces a New Joint-Employer Standard 
Under the Board’s previous, thirty-year-old standard, a joint employer’s 
control over employees was required to be “direct and immediate, not ‘limited 
and routine.’”43 The previous standard required that in order to “affect[] the 
terms and conditions of employment to such a degree [as to] be deemed a joint 
employer,”44 a putative joint employer must actually exercise control over the 
                                                                                                                     
 38 Id. 
 39 Of particular importance, the Agreement reserved the following authority to BFI: 
(1) although Leadpoint “recruit[s], interview[s], test[s], select[s], and hire[s]” the personnel 
contracted to complete the work for BFI, BFI retains the right to request that the Leadpoint 
personnel “meet or exceed” BFI’s “standard selection procedures and tests” before being 
hired by Leadpoint; (2) although Leadpoint has “sole responsibility to counsel, discipline, 
review, evaluate, and terminate” personnel assigned to the BFI location, BFI retains the 
authority to “reject” and “discontinue the use” of any Leadpoint personnel “for any or no 
reason,” and there have been several incidents where Leadpoint personnel’s discipline was 
a result of BFI action; (3) Leadpoint may not pay its personnel a rate greater than BFI pays 
its similarly situated employees without BFI’s explicit approval; (4) although Leadpoint 
“alone schedules which employees will work each shift,” the Agreement does not allocate 
Leadpoint any control over what the actual shift schedule will be or the facility’s working 
hours; (5) during daily supervisor meetings, BFI supervisors instruct which material 
streams will operate during the following shift and “establish the work priorities” of each 
shift, and to achieve these priorities, BFI, and BFI alone, may control and make various 
adjustments to the speed of the streams; and (6) if BFI managers observe issues with 
Leadpoint personnel productivity, the managers are to report it to the Leadpoint supervisors 
who are “expected to address those issues with the employees.” Id. at *3–9. 
 40 Id. at *1, *8. 
 41 Id. at *1, *9.  
 42 Browning-Ferris, 2015 WL 5047768, at *10. 
 43 Id. at *17. 
 44 Id. at *14 (quoting TLI, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 798, 799 (1984)). 
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workers at issue, and not merely contractually reserve authority to do so.45 
Thus, contractual provisions granting a company the potential authority to 
control a workforce’s terms and conditions of employment were insufficiently 
“direct and immediate” to establish joint-employer status unless the putative 
employer actually exercised the reserved authority.46  
The Board’s refusal to recognize indirect exercises of control allowed 
putative joint employers to escape collective-bargaining and other employer 
obligations even if the putative employer had “exercised control that 
significantly affected employees’ terms and conditions of employment.”47 The 
circumstances under which the NLRB could find a joint-employment 
relationship were further restricted by the standard’s exception for putative 
joint employers who exercised only “limited and routine” control.48  
After analyzing NLRB precedent, the NLRA’s language, and the NLRA’s 
underlying policies,49 the Board found that its standard “significantly and 
unjustifiably narrow[ed] the circumstances where a joint-employment 
relationship c[ould] be found.”50 Thus, the NLRB revisited its standard in 
order to better effectuate the NLRA’s purposes in the current, rapidly evolving 
economic environment.51 Specifically, the Board was concerned about the 
rapid growth of contingent employment relationships52—in many instances, 
                                                                                                                     
 45 Id. 
 46 See id. (quoting Airborne Express, 338 N.L.R.B. 597, 597 n.1 (2002)). 
 47 Id. 
 48 Browning-Ferris, 2015 WL 5047768, at *14. For instance, in TLI, Inc., the Board 
found that a putative joint employer only exercised “limited and routine” control over 
drivers even though it had taken the following actions: commanded drivers as to which 
deliveries were to be made on any given day, filed incident reports with the supplier 
employer (or staffing agency) when drivers engaged in conduct adverse to the putative 
joint employer’s operations, received accident reports, and maintained driver logs and 
records. TLI, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. at 799. 
 49 Browning-Ferris, 2015 WL 5047768, at *1 (stating that the Board added additional 
requirements to establishing joint-employer status without explanation and that had “no 
clear basis” in the cited precedent or “in the text or policies of the [NLRA]”); see, e.g., 
Value Village, 161 N.L.R.B. 603, 607 (1966) (“[T]he power to control is present by virtue 
of the operating agreement, whether or not exercised . . . .”). Thus, as the NLRB explained 
in Browning-Ferris, prior NLRB decisions establish that the right to control employees 
traditionally had some probative value whether or not the putative joint employer actually 
exercised its reserved authority. Browning-Ferris, 2015 WL 5047768, at *12. 
 50 Browning-Ferris, 2015 WL 5047768, at *2. 
 51 Id. at *1. 
 52 Id. at *11 (noting that in these contingent employment relationships, “the user firm 
can influence the supplier firm’s bargaining posture by threatening to terminate its contract 
with the supplier if wages and benefits rise above a set cost threshold”). In 2005, 
contingent employees accounted for as much as 4.1% of all employees, or 5.7 million 
workers. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Contingent and Alternative Employment 
Arrangements, February 2005 (July 27, 2005), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/conem 
p.pdf [https://perma.cc/CX3C-SEDC]. Since that time, the number of contingent 
employment relationships has continued to grow. See Browning-Ferris, 2015 WL 
5047768, at *11. 
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these arrangements seemed to be created by companies primarily to avoid 
labor law liability and other employer responsibilities.53 The Board found this 
development “reason enough” to revisit its joint-employer standard as “[t]he 
primary function and responsibility of the Board . . . is that ‘of applying the 
general provisions of the [NLRA] to the complexities of industrial life.’”54 
In order to more faithfully promote the purposes of the NLRA and 
common law agency principles,55 the NLRB adopted a new, two-step joint-
employer standard. The NLRB’s new standard requires that in order to qualify 
as a joint employer, the Board must determine that (1) an employment 
relationship exists under the common law agency test,56 and (2) “the putative 
joint employer possesses sufficient control over employees’ essential terms 
and conditions of employment to permit meaningful collective bargaining.”57  
The Board argued that this standard is consistent with the common law of 
agency because it “properly considers the existence, extent, and object of the 
putative joint employer’s control.”58 However, central to the controversy 
surrounding Browning-Ferris, the NLRB’s new standard will no longer 
require that a joint employer actually exercise control over the employees at 
issue, finding that this requirement was Board-created and inconsistent with 
the common law of agency.59 A putative joint employer may satisfy the new 
standard if it merely “possess[es] the authority to control [the] employees’ 
terms and conditions of employment,”60 and even if action is taken indirectly, 
“through an intermediary.”61  
Under its new joint-employer standard, the NLRB found that BFI and 
Leadpoint were, in fact, joint employers of the personnel provided by 
                                                                                                                     
 53 See Browning-Ferris, 2015 WL 5047768, at *15. 
 54 Id. (omission in original) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 496 
(1979)). 
 55 Id. at *2 (“Our aim today is to put the Board’s joint-employer standard on a clearer 
and stronger analytical foundation, and, within the limits set out by the [NLRA], to best 
serve the Federal policy of ‘encouraging the practice and procedure of collective 
bargaining.’” (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012))). 
 56 The Board must determine whether the putative joint employers “share or 
codetermine those matters governing the essential terms and conditions of employment.” 
Id. (quoting NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Pa., Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 1123 (3d Cir. 
1982)). However, the Board noted that “the existence of a common-law employment 
relationship is necessary, but not [necessarily] sufficient, to find joint-employer status.” Id. 
at *16. The putative joint employer must also satisfy the second prong before qualifying as 
a joint employer under the new standard. See id. 
 57 Id. at *2; see also id. at *16 (“To best promote this policy, our joint-employer 
standard—to the extent permitted by the common law—should encompass the full range of 
employment relationships wherein meaningful collective bargaining is, in fact, possible.”).  
 58 Id.  
 59 Browning-Ferris, 2015 WL 5047768, at *17. 
 60 Id. at *2 (“Reserved authority to control terms and conditions of employment, even 
if not exercised, is clearly relevant to the joint-employment inquiry.”). 
 61 Id. 
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Leadpoint.62 The Board determined that BFI qualified as an employer under 
common law standards because it has both the right to control the Leadpoint 
personnel and has actually exercised this control, both directly and 
indirectly.63 BFI’s relationship with the Leadpoint personnel also satisfied the 
second prong of the Board’s new joint-employer standard: Leadpoint and BFI 
“share[] or codetermine[] those matters governing the essential terms and 
conditions of employment for the Leadpoint employees.”64 Thus, BFI’s 
presence at the bargaining table would permit, and even encourage, more 
meaningful collective bargaining.65 
Although the majority indicated that the employment relationship at issue 
likely would have satisfied the Board’s prior standard as well, the members 
recognized that its new joint-employer standard might raise concerns.66 
However, the majority maintained that “reevaluating doctrines, refining legal 
rules, and sometimes reversing precedent are familiar parts of the Board’s 
work”67 and part of the nature of administrative decisionmaking.68 The 
majority categorized many of the anticipated implications of its decisions as 
“law-school-exam hypothetical[s] of doomsday scenarios” that likely over-
exaggerate the business and economic consequences of requiring multiple 
employers to join together at the collective-bargaining table.69 
C. The Dissent: An Impermissible Departure from Common Law 
Principles 
The dissenting Board members rejected the majority’s argument that 
broadening the joint-employer standard was necessary due to developments in 
the labor market.70 The dissent argued that Congress was aware of contingent 
and arms-length business relationships at the time the NLRA was enacted in 
                                                                                                                     
 62 Id. at *3. 
 63 Id. at *22 (describing BFI’s right to control the Leadpoint employees as 
“indisputable”). 
 64 Id. The Board based its decisions on the fact that BFI retains “significant control” 
over who Leadpoint could hire to work at its facility, reserves an “unqualified right” to 
discontinue any employee assigned to its facilities by Leadpoint for any reason, exercises 
control over “the processes that shape day-to-day work” of the Leadpoint employees 
(unilaterally controlling several factors), dictates many aspects of the Leadpoint 
employees’ schedules and tasks, and plays a significant role in determining the wages of 
these employees by preventing Leadpoint from paying them more than BFI employees 
performing similar work. Id. at *22–24. 
 65 After this decision, BFI refused to bargain with its joint employees and recently 
appealed the Board’s decision to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit. See Brief of Petitioner/Cross Respondent, supra note 10, at 1–2. 
 66 See Browning-Ferris, 2015 WL 5047768, at *24. 
 67 Id. (quoting UGL-UNICCO Serv. Co., 357 N.L.R.B. 801, 804 (2011)). 
 68 Id.  
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at *25 (Members Miscimarra & Johnson, dissenting). 
2017] AN EXAMINATION OF BROWNING-FERRIS 237 
1935, as well as when it was amended in 1947; however, Congress chose to 
limit bargaining obligations to common law employers.71 The dissent 
contended that the Board’s new standard essentially returns to the “more 
expansive policy-based economic realities” test expressly rejected by Congress 
through the Taft–Hartley amendments.72 Thus, the dissent concluded that the 
majority’s new standard exceeds the power delegated to the Board by 
Congress73 by departing from the common law of agency standard for 
determining employment relationships—a standard that precedent and 
legislative history establish the Board must follow.74  
The dissent argued that the Board’s new standard is not based in agency 
law at all, but rather forwards a policy agenda to equalize bargaining power 
between employers and employees.75 Although the dissenting Board members 
recognized that the Board is allowed some movement and independence in 
determining joint-employment relationships, they found that the majority 
members failed to fit their sudden departure from established precedent into 
the controlling statutory framework or to adequately explain why such a 
departure was necessary.76  
The dissent also took issue with the “dramatic implications” that the 
majority’s new standard will have on the economy—impacts that the affected 
businesses would have no reason to predict or plan for.77 Further, the 
dissenting members alleged that the Board’s new joint-employer standard will 
actually destabilize collective-bargaining relationships by forcing too many 
parties with divided interests to the same bargaining table.78 In any case, the 
                                                                                                                     
 71 Id. (“Many forms of subcontracting, outsourcing, and temporary or contingent 
employment date back to long before the 1935 passage of the Act. Congress was obviously 
aware of the existence of third-party intermediary business relationships in 1935. . . . [I]t is 
the inescapable conclusion that follows from Supreme Court precedent recognizing that the 
Act did not confer ‘employer’ status on third parties merely because commercial 
relationships made them interdependent with an ‘employer’ and its employees.”). 
 72 Browning-Ferris, 2015 WL 5047768, pt. III.A (Members Miscimarra & Johnson, 
dissenting); see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 401–531 (2012). 
 73 See Browning-Ferris, 2015 WL 5047768, at *25 (Members Miscimarra & Johnson, 
dissenting) (arguing that the Board is merely to act as a “referee” of the collective 
bargaining process, and is “certainly not vested with general authority to define national 
economic policy by balancing the competing interests of different business enterprises”). 
 74 Id. (citing NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 260 (1968)). 
 75 Id. pt. VII. 
 76 Id. pt. II. 
 77 Id. at *25. 
 78 Id. pt. V.A (describing the Majority’s new standard as “near-limitless,” as it could 
potentially encompasses and impact almost every business relationship). The dissenting 
NLRB members took specific concern with the idea that under the majority’s new joint-
employer standard, franchisors might be considered joint employers with their franchisees. 
Id. pt. V.D. Because of the unique structure of franchising arrangements, in many cases the 
right to control reserved by the franchisor in the franchise agreement “has nothing to do 
with labor policy,” but is instead due to statutory requirements to maintain trademark 
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dissent argued that the joint-employer standard is a “determination of pure 
agency law involv[ing] no special administrative expertise that a court does 
not possess.”79 Therefore, the dissent seemed to conclude that the “‘potentially 
massive’ economic implications” of the Board’s decision, as well as its 
unexplained departure from established precedent, might provide courts 
grounds to overturn or depart from the Board’s new standard.80 
III. TRADITIONAL JUDICIAL REVIEW OF NLRB DECISIONS 
Typically, when courts review NLRB decisions or rulemaking actions, 
such as that exercised in Browning-Ferris, courts will allocate deference to the 
Board’s action in a manner consistent with Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council and its progeny.81 However, in certain 
circumstances, courts have been more reluctant to blindly defer to Board 
action without considering the deeper policy implications of the action.82 This 
Part will first discuss the standard courts typically apply when analyzing an 
administrative agency’s interpretation or application of a statute and will then 
examine situations where courts have more readily departed from this 
standard.  
A. The Development of the Chevron Deference Doctrine 
In Chevron, the Supreme Court adopted a two-part test for determining 
whether a court should defer to an administrative agency’s interpretation of a 
statute.83 First, a court must analyze whether Congress has “directly spoken to 
                                                                                                                     
protection as well as the franchisor’s rational business interest in protecting the quality of 
their brand. Id. 
 79 Browning-Ferris, 2015 WL 5047768, at *25 (Members Miscimarra & Johnson, 
dissenting) (quoting NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 260 (1968)) 
(“[C]ourts have afforded the Board deference in this context merely as to the Board’s 
ability to make factual distinctions when applying the common-law agency standard. 
However, our colleagues mistakenly interpret this as a grant of authority to modify the 
agency standard itself. This type of change is clearly within the province of Congress, not 
the Board.” (footnote omitted)). 
 80 See id. pt. VII (quoting Christopher v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 
2167 (2012)). 
 81 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984); 
see, e.g., Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 536 (1992) (“Like other administrative 
agencies, the NLRB is entitled to judicial deference when it interprets an ambiguous 
provision of a statute that it administers.”). However, it is worth noting that there has also 
been a significant push to abandon the Chevron doctrine. See Juan Carlos Rodriguez, GOP 
Push to ‘Repeal’ Chevron Deference May Come Up Short, LAW360 (Jan. 5, 2017), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/877708/gop-push-to-repeal-chevron-deference-may-com 
e-up-short [https://perma.cc/M8J6-WC3T]. 
 82 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 83 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
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the precise question at issue” through the statute being administered,84 or if the 
statute is ambiguous as to the question at-hand. Second, if the court finds the 
statute to be ambiguous, the court must then determine whether the agency’s 
interpretation is reasonable or permissible within the statutory framework.85 In 
Chevron, the Supreme Court recognized that Congress might delegate 
authority to an administrative agency explicitly or implicitly through its 
silence or ambiguity.86 In either case, “a court may not substitute its own 
construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by 
the administrator of an agency.”87 The Court justified congressional deference 
to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of a statute based on the agency’s 
greater expertise and experience.88 Thus, the Court stated that courts should 
not disturb an agency’s reasonable interpretation of a statute “unless it appears 
from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not one 
that Congress would have sanctioned.”89 
The Supreme Court has issued several opinions since Chevron further 
defining the appropriate scope of judicial review of administrative agency 
action. In United States v. Mead Corp., the Court introduced a possible “Step 
Zero” to the Chevron deference doctrine.90 At this step, prior to deciding 
whether the delegating statute is ambiguous, courts must first analyze whether 
Chevron deference is warranted at all based on the type and extent of authority 
the statute delegates to the agency.91 Chevron deference to an administrative 
agency’s action is only warranted “when it appears that Congress delegated 
authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and 
that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the 
exercise of that authority.”92  
                                                                                                                     
 84 Id. at 842. Here, the NLRA is the statute being administered. More specifically, the 
issue being addressed is the meaning of “joint employer” under the NLRA. Because the 
NLRA does not explicitly define “joint employer,” this standard has traditionally been tied 
to the Board’s standard for determining whether an entity is an “employer.” See Browning-
Ferris, 2015 WL 5047768, at *15. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2012), for the NLRA’s broad 
definition of “employer.” 
 85 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
 86 Id. at 842–44. 
 87 Id. at 844. 
 88 Id. (recognizing that the Court has consistently deferred to agency interpretations 
“whenever [a] decision as to the meaning or reach of a statute has involved reconciling 
conflicting policies, and a full understanding . . . in the given situation . . . depend[s] upon 
more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected to agency regulations” 
(quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382 (1961))). 
 89 Id. at 845 (quoting Shimer, 367 U.S. at 383). 
 90 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227–31 (2001). 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at 226–27 (explaining that an administrative agency can establish that Congress 
delegated authority intended to have the force of law “in a variety of ways,” including “an 
agency’s power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking”). 
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The Court’s Mead decision explains that agencies “make all sorts of 
interpretive choices, and . . . not all of those choices bind judges to follow 
them.”93 However, even interpretative choices that do not merit Chevron-level 
deference might still influence court decisions regarding a related matter.94 
Thus, Mead establishes that a court’s deference to an agency’s action varies 
with the circumstances.95 Therefore, when determining the level of deference 
to afford an agency action, courts should consider, among other factors, “the 
degree of the agency’s care, its consistency,” the “formality” of the process 
followed in creating the rule, the agency’s “relative expertness,” and “the 
persuasiveness of the agency’s position.”96 
In National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet 
Services, the Court extended the situations in which courts may extend 
Chevron deference to administrative agencies’ statutory interpretations.97 The 
Court held that a court’s interpretation of a statute will not trump an agency’s 
otherwise permissible interpretation, unless the court holds that the controlling 
statute is “unambiguous” and “leaves no room for agency discretion.”98 
Perhaps more importantly when considering the issue presented by Browning-
Ferris, the Brand X Court further explained that “[a]gency inconsistency is not 
a basis for declining to analyze the agency’s interpretation under the Chevron 
framework.”99 As the Court explained, when an agency interprets a statute, the 
agency must choose between several interpretations and continuously 
reconsider the wisdom of its interpretative policy.100 The “wisdom” of any 
                                                                                                                     
 93 Id. at 227. 
 94 See id. at 227–28; see also, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 642 (1998); 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139–40 (1944).  
 95 Mead, 533 U.S. at 228 (“The approach has produced a spectrum of judicial 
responses, from great respect at one end, to near indifference at the other.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 96 Id. (footnote omitted). The Court’s Mead analysis indicates that if an agency is 
inconsistent, only follows informal rulemaking procedures, or the rule addresses a subject 
over which the agency has no special expertise, courts may elect to extend something 
similar to Skidmore “weight” rather than Chevron deference. See id.; see also Skidmore, 
323 U.S. at 139–40. 
 97 The synthesized rule under Chevron and Mead is that a court should defer to an 
agency’s interpretation of a statute if it determines that Congress delegated the agency 
rulemaking authority, the statute delegating the authority is ambiguous as to the precise 
question at issue, and the agency’s interpretation is reasonably within the ambiguity and 
statutory structure. Mead, 533 U.S. at 227–31; Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–45 (1984). 
 98 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 
(2005) (“This principle follows from Chevron itself.”). 
 99 Id. at 981 (emphasis added). 
 100 Id. (“An initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone.” (quoting 
Chevron, 467 U.S at 863)). 
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particular statutory interpretation logically depends on circumstances such as 
changes in the surrounding legal, economic, and political landscape.101  
However, in Brand X the Court did indicate that an agency’s inconsistent 
interpretation of a statute, or unexplained departure from prior precedent, may 
be grounds for finding a new interpretation to be “arbitrary and capricious” 
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).102 Scholars have interpreted 
this language as a clear indicator that judicial review of agency decisions 
should include review for arbitrary or capricious action in addition to the 
conditions necessary to qualify for Chevron deference.103 Courts have applied 
this review for arbitrariness as part of Chevron’s “Step Two” analysis for 
reasonability, or as a separate, supplementary step.104 An agency interpretation 
or rule is considered arbitrary or capricious if 
the agency . . . relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to 
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the 
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to 
the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not 
be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency 
expertise.105  
This understanding of judicial review of agency action is especially 
relevant when considering the language of the NLRA. Congress delegates to 
the NLRB the authority to make and amend rules and regulations “in the 
manner prescribed by” the APA.106 Courts have interpreted this language to 
                                                                                                                     
 101 See id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863–64). As the Brand X Court recognized, 
“the whole point of Chevron is to leave the discretion provided by the ambiguities of a 
statute with the implementing agency.” Id. (quoting Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 
U.S. 735, 742 (1996)). 
 102 Id. (“Unexplained inconsistency is, at most, a reason for holding an interpretation to 
be an arbitrary and capricious change from agency practice under the Administrative 
Procedure Act.”); see also Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012) (stating 
that the reviewing court shall “set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to 
be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law” or “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations”). 
 103 For example, Michael C. Harper has stated:  
After Brand X, it thus should be clear to courts, if it was not clear before, that 
their review of agency formulations of legal doctrine should include the serious 
arbitrary or capricious review delineated in decisions like State Farm. This is true 
even in cases where the agency formulations are embodied in statutory constructions 
for which Chevron deference is claimed. 
Michael C. Harper, Judicial Control of the National Labor Relations Board’s Lawmaking 
in the Age of Chevron and Brand X, 89 B.U. L. REV. 189, 210 (2009). 
 104 Id. 
 105 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 
(1983). 
 106 29 U.S.C. § 156 (2012). 
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mean that Congress has delegated the Board broad discretion to exercise its 
rulemaking authority to the fullest extent possible under the APA.107 Had 
Congress intended to limit the Board’s authority, it would have done so either 
in the NLRA’s text or legislative history.108 Thus, the Board is generally 
allowed reasonable space to adjust its rules and regulations, including its 
interpretation of “employee” and “employer.”109 As stated in NLRB v. Town & 
Country Electric, Inc., the Board’s construction of these terms “is entitled to 
considerable deference.”110 
B. Limits of Chevron Deference to the NLRB 
Although courts reviewing the NLRB’s action typically apply the analysis 
laid out in the previous Part, there are instances in which courts have more 
readily declined to defer to the Board. Many of these situations could be 
properly categorized as falling under Chevron Step Zero.111 Courts have more 
frequently declined to extend full Chevron deference to Board rules and 
regulations based on several factors: the NLRB’s degree of care or formality in 
enacting a regulation, its consistency, its relative expertise, and the 
persuasiveness of the Board’s position.112 
Courts have declined to defer to Board action based on the Board’s lack of 
expertise if it is “neither a case where the agency is in a better position to find 
facts, nor a situation where the NLRB’s expertise in labor relations or its 
special role as a primary source of national labor policy serves as a basis for 
                                                                                                                     
 107 See, e.g., Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 613 (1991). 
 108 Id. (“As a matter of statutory drafting, if Congress had intended to curtail in a 
particular area the broad rulemaking authority granted in § 6, we would have expected it to 
do so in language expressly describing an exception from that section or at least referring 
specifically to the section.”). 
 109 See, e.g., NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 94 (1995). 
 110 Id. (“[W]hen reviewing the Board’s interpretation of the term ‘employee’ as it is 
used in the Act, we have repeatedly said that ‘[s]ince the task of defining the term 
“employee” is one that “has been assigned primarily to the agency created by Congress to 
administer the Act,” . . . the Board’s construction of that term is entitled to considerable 
deference . . . .’” (second alteration and omissions in original) (quoting Sure-Tan, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 891 (1984))). But see FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 849 F.3d 
1123, 1127–28 (D.C. Cir. 2017).  
 111 See supra notes 90–92 and accompanying text. 
 112 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001). There are several 
examples of courts stating that inconsistent NLRB decisions deserve less deference. E.g., 
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza–Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1987) 
(“An agency interpretation of a relevant provision which conflicts with the agency’s earlier 
interpretation is ‘entitled to considerably less deference’ than a consistently held agency 
view.” (quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 273 (1981))); Bath Marine Draftsmen’s 
Ass’n v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 14, 25 (1st Cir. 2007) (explaining that when “the Board has not 
been consistent in its choice of standard,” “the Board is not entitled to the normal deference 
we owe it”). 
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deference in fact finding.”113 Of particular importance when reviewing the 
Board’s Browning-Ferris joint-employer standard, courts have found that pure 
agency law determinations “involve[] no special administrative expertise that a 
court does not possess.”114 Thus, courts “do not grant great or even ‘normal[ ]’ 
deference” to NLRB decisions regarding employment status determinations 
and will only uphold the Board’s determinations if “it can be said to have 
‘made a choice between two fairly conflicting views.’”115 Therefore, a Board 
status determination, or presumptively the standard the Board applies, should 
not be upheld if it “overlook[s] accepted principles of the law of agency.”116 
Similar to this rationale, reviewing courts might also refuse to defer to 
Board decisions that “rest[] on erroneous legal foundations.”117 For instance, 
courts are less likely to defer to a Board decision if it involves a finding of law 
rather than of fact, as the “final word on the law—including statutory 
interpretation—rests with the courts.”118 The Browning-Ferris joint-employer 
standard could face additional scrutiny for this reason: not only have courts 
determined that the Board has no special expertise as to the bounds of agency 
law, but determinations of agency status are also not pure questions of fact.119 
In addition, courts have been reluctant to defer to an agency’s “apparent 
departure[]” from its own precedent unless the agency provides an adequate 
explanation for its decision.120 The need for an explanation is particularly 
important when an administrative agency is “applying a multi-factor test 
                                                                                                                     
 113 NLRB v. Allied Mech. Servs., Inc., 734 F.3d 486, 491 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Bob 
Evans Farms, Inc. v. NLRB, 163 F.3d 1012, 1019 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 114 NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 260 (1968); see also Radio 
Officers’ Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 50 (1954) (stating that determination of 
independent contractor status is not a “specialized field of knowledge” such that the NLRB 
“carr[ies] the authority of an expertness which courts do not possess and therefore must 
respect” (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951))). 
 115 FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 496 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (alteration in 
original) (quoting C.C. E., Inc. v. NLRB, 60 F.3d 855, 858 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). 
 116 NLRB v. Friendly Cab Co., 512 F.3d 1090, 1096 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting SIDA of 
Haw., Inc. v. NLRB, 512 F.2d 354, 357 (9th Cir. 1975)).  
 117 Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 539 (1992) (quoting NLRB v. Babcock & 
Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956)) (refusing to give deference, even after Chevron, to 
the Board’s construction of ambiguous statutory language because it was not based on 
sound legal principles).  
 118 See, e.g., Bob Evans Farms, 163 F.3d at 1016–17 (finding the applicability of 
Chevron deference was “by no means clear” because the NLRB’s interpretation was 
contrary to judicial precedent, involved a legal conclusion, and was contrary to 
congressional intent). 
 119 See, e.g., Friendly Cab Co., 512 F.3d at 1096–97. These questions are typically 
viewed as questions of fact; however, sometimes they are considered mixed questions of 
law and fact. For example, the court in Friendly Cab Co. undertook “a fact-based inquiry 
applying common law principles of agency” to determine cab drivers’ employment status. 
See id. 
 120 LeMoyne-Owen Coll. v. NLRB, 357 F.3d 55, 60–61 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
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through case-by-case adjudication,”121 such as the Board’s Browning-Ferris 
joint-employer standard. In these cases, an agency’s explanation for its new 
standard has special significance—it provides courts with directions as to how 
the standard should be applied in different factual situations.122 A broad, 
totality of the circumstances standard “can become simply a cloak for agency 
whim—or worse.”123  
In summary, courts typically defer to the NLRB if the Board’s action is 
consistent with the Chevron deference doctrine.124 Determining whether a 
Board action is deserving of Chevron deference is a multi-step process: the 
Board’s action must be within the authority delegated to it by Congress under 
the NLRA (Step Zero), must concern a question that the NLRA does not 
directly answer (Step One), and must be reasonable within the boundaries of 
the NLRA’s framework and ambiguity (Step Two).125 If these steps are met, a 
reviewing court will typically defer to the Board unless the action is found to 
be arbitrary or capricious under the APA.126 Thus, when determining if the 
Board is following a permissible joint-employer standard, the first step is to 
ascertain what guidance the NLRA provides as to the appropriate standard and 
the extent of any ambiguity reserved for the Board’s discretion in 
administering the statute. 
IV. THE PURPOSE AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NLRA 
The NLRA does not explicitly define “joint employer” or otherwise 
provide direct insight as to the controlling standard to be used when 
determining if such a relationship exists. However, an examination of the 
purposes of the NLRA, and Congress’s direction as to the appropriate standard 
for determining when an employer–employee relationship exists, provide 
informative guidance as to the scope of authority delegated to the NLRB in 
determining its joint-employer standard. 
The NLRA’s “unique purpose” is “to preserve the balance of power 
between labor and management”127 and to “encourag[e] and protect[] the 
                                                                                                                     
 121 Id. at 61.  
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. Apparently, Justice Roberts agrees that an agency’s inadequate explanation for a 
departure from its own precedent may be reason for courts to refuse to defer to the 
agency’s decision, or at least he did during his tenure as a circuit court judge when he 
drafted this opinion. See id. 
 124 See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 125 See supra Part III.A. 
 126 See supra notes 102–08 and accompanying text. 
 127 Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2445 n.7 (2013); see also NLRB v. 
Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571, 573 (1994) (explaining that Congress 
amended the NLRA to exclude supervisors in order to address the “imbalance between 
labor and management”). The NLRA’s Declaration of Policy is contained in 29 U.S.C. 
§ 151 (2012). 
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collective-bargaining process.”128 By uniting and engaging in collective 
bargaining, workers are provided the opportunity to participate in meaningful 
negotiations over their terms and conditions of employment “with the parties 
who are the primary beneficiaries of their work”129—namely, their 
employers.130 In other words, the purpose of the NLRA is to encourage 
collective bargaining between workers and any capital provider enjoying 
direct or indirect control over the workers’ employment conditions.131 
The 1947 Taft–Hartley amendments to the NLRA clarified the Act’s 
definition of employment relationships and the applicable standard for 
determining when such a relationship exists under the Act. The Taft–Hartley 
amendments were introduced, in part, in response to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., which upheld the NLRB’s 
expansive interpretation of the word “employee.”132  
According to the Court in Hearst, whether an employment relationship 
existed was to be determined under what is now referred to as the “economic 
realities test.” Under this test, employment relationships were to be determined 
broadly, assessing the “underlying economic facts” of the employment 
relationship.133 The Court rationalized that “[w]here all the conditions of the 
relation require protection, protection ought to be given.”134 Employee status 
was to be determined “primarily from the history, terms and purposes of the 
[NLRA],” instead of “technically and exclusively by previously established 
legal classifications,” such as the common law of agency.135 Finally, the 
Hearst economic realities standard seemed to offer almost blind deference to 
NLRB determinations of employee–employer status.136 The Court found that 
this duty belonged to the Board rather than the courts because of the Board’s 
expertise regarding “the abilities and needs of the workers for self-
organization and collective action.”137  
Congressional response to the Hearst interpretation of “employee” was 
swift and “adverse.”138 The Taft–Hartley amendments were enacted three 
years later and specifically excluded independent contractors from the 
                                                                                                                     
 128 NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 91 (1995) (quoting Sure-Tan, 
Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 892 (1984)). 
 129 Harper, supra note 9, at 331 (explaining that the purpose of the NLRA is to 
encourage collective bargaining between workers and those parties with “the potential 
interest and . . . ability to offer enhanced wages” to the workers). 
 130 See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2)–(3). 
 131 See Harper, supra note 9, at 331–33. 
 132 NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 129 (1944), overruled in part by 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992). 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. (quoting Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 F. 547, 552 (2d Cir. 1914)). 
 135 Id. at 124, 129. 
 136 Id. at 130. 
 137 Id.  
 138 NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968). 
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NLRA’s coverage.139 Congress’s clear intent in enacting the Taft–Hartley 
amendments was to limit, but not abrogate, the NLRB’s authority to set the 
applicable standards for determining employment relationships: “It is 
inconceivable that Congress, when it passed the act, authorized the Board to 
give to every word in the act whatever meaning it wished.”140 The purpose and 
legislative history of the Taft–Hartley amendments, as well as the Supreme 
Court’s subsequent precedent, establish that Congress intended the NLRB 
apply common law principles of agency when determining employer and joint-
employer status.141 
Because finding an employment relationship is central to determining 
whether a joint-employment relationship exists, it follows that the joint-
employer standard must likewise be consistent with common law principles of 
agency. Thus, courts should accord the Browning-Ferris joint-employer 
standard deference if it is reasonably consistent with the common law of 
agency.142 
V. COURTS SHOULD DEFER TO THE BROWNING-FERRIS JOINT-EMPLOYER 
STANDARD 
As established in the previous parts, the text of 29 U.S.C. § 156,143 the 
NLRA’s legislative history,144 and the NLRA’s stated purpose in 29 U.S.C. 
§ 151 all establish that Congress clearly intended to delegate to the NLRB the 
authority to determine and adjust the joint-employer relationship necessary to 
justify collective-bargaining requirements, as long as the standard provided 
was consistent with the common law of agency.145 Thus, reviewing courts 
should defer to the NLRB’s Browning-Ferris joint-employer standard because 
                                                                                                                     
 139 Labor Management Relations (Taft–Hartley) Act, ch. 120, sec. 101, § 2(3), 61 Stat. 
136, 137–38 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012)); see also United 
Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. at 256. 
 140 H.R. REP. NO. 80-245, at 18 (1947).  
 141 See, e.g., Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 740 (1989) 
(“[W]e have concluded that Congress intended to describe the conventional master-servant 
relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine.”); United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 
U.S. at 256 (“The obvious purpose of this amendment was to have the Board and the courts 
apply general agency principles in distinguishing between employees and independent 
contractors under the Act.”). 
 142 The current definitions of “employee” and “employer” are found in 29 U.S.C. 
§ 152. “Employer” is defined broadly and vaguely as “any person acting as an agent of an 
employer, directly or indirectly,” and the statute articulates several excluded employers, 
including public employers. Id. § 152(2). “Employee” is defined to include “any employee, 
and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter 
explicitly states otherwise, . . . but shall not include . . . any individual having the status of 
an independent contractor.” Id. § 152(3). 
 143 See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 144 See supra Part IV. 
 145 See supra Part IV. 
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(1) the standard is permissible under traditional agency principles, (2) the 
standard is not an attempt to reinstate the Hearst economic realities test, and 
(3) the new standard is justified by developments in the American economy 
and will not necessarily result in any unjustified or dramatic economic 
ramifications.146 
A. The Browning-Ferris Joint-Employer Standard Is Reasonably 
Consistent with Common Law Principles of Agency 
Although it is clear that Congress delegated to the NLRB the authority to 
adjust the standard for determining whether joint-employer relationships exist, 
it is also clear that Congress did not delegate to the Board unlimited 
authority.147 As stated, the legislative history of the Taft–Hartley amendments 
establishes that Congress intended that the Board apply common law 
principles of agency in determining whether employment relationships 
exist.148 Because the NLRA is not ambiguous as to the standard Congress 
intended the Board to apply,149 reviewing courts should only defer to the 
Board’s Browning-Ferris standard if it is reasonably consistent with common 
law principles of agency.150  
                                                                                                                     
 146 Some circuits, such as the D.C. Circuit, have held that the NLRB’s standard for 
determining employment relationships is not entitled to Chevron deference because it is 
well-settled that common law principles of agency must guide the Board’s status 
determinations. FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 849 F.3d 1123, 1127–28 (D.C. Cir. 
2017). This Note does not dispute that the NLRB must follow common law principles of 
agency. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. Rather, this Note argues that the 
common law itself is ambiguous and leaves the NLRB some room as to how the standard is 
applied. See infra Part V.A.1. This is supported by the fact that both the Supreme Court 
and NLRB have understood and applied the common law of agency differently across time. 
See FedEx Home Delivery, 849 F.3d at 1124–27. 
 147 See supra notes 140–41 and accompanying text. 
 148 See supra notes 140–41 and accompanying text. 
 149 See supra note 141. 
 150 Because Congress clearly delegated the Board the authority to shape the rules and 
regulations as necessary to carry out the NLRA, such as who qualifies as an “employer” or 
“joint employer” under the Act, Browning-Ferris’s well-explained change in standard 
survives Chevron Step Zero. See 29 U.S.C. § 156 (2012); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 
U.S. 218, 227–31 (2001). The Browning-Ferris decision also survives Step One of the 
Chevron model because although the statute is not ambiguous about the fact that the 
NLRB’s joint-employer standard must be consistent with the common law of agency, the 
common law standard is ambiguous as to the precise question at issue—the exact 
parameter of control a putative employer must possess or exercise in order to establish a 
common law employment relationship. See NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 
U.S. 85, 92–94 (1995). Thus, the question that remains is whether the Browning-Ferris 
standard survives the final step of Chevron—whether finding an employment relationship 
based on the unexercised right to control is consistent with the common law of agency—
and whether this standard is “arbitrary or capricious.” See supra note 102 and 
accompanying text. The decision would be arbitrary and capricious if the NLRB 
considered factors Congress had not intended it to consider, such as the Hearst economic 
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1. The Second and Third Restatements of Agency Permit Finding an 
Employment Relationship When a Putative Employer Possesses Only 
Indirect or Unexercised Control over Workers 
The Supreme Court has seemingly accepted the Second Restatement of 
Agency as expressing the general common law of agency.151 Thus, in order for 
reviewing courts to afford Chevron deference to the NLRB’s Browning-Ferris 
joint-employer standard, the Board’s new standard must be reasonably 
consistent with the Second Restatement’s standard for assessing employment 
relationships. 
The Second Restatement of Agency was adopted in 1958 for the purpose 
“of keeping the statements of law current with the growth of [court] decisions 
in each subject.”152 Although the Second Restatement does not have a section 
explicitly defining the standard for determining employee–employer 
relationships, section 220 defines the factors that should be considered when 
determining master–servant relationships.153 A servant is defined as a person 
employed by another who is subject to the other entity’s control or right to 
control over the servant’s performance of his or her duties.154 Comment (d) of 
                                                                                                                     
realities test. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 
29, 43 (1983). 
 151 See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751 (1989); see also 
Michael C. Harper, Fashioning a General Common Law for Employment in an Age of 
Statutes, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1281, 1291–94 (2015). 
 152 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY intro. (AM. LAW INST. 1958). 
 153 Id. § 220(2). In determining whether a putative employee actually shares an 
employment relationship with a putative employer, or is merely an independent contractor 
who is exempt from coverage under the NLRA, the following “matters of fact” are to be 
considered: 
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over 
the details of the work; 
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or 
business; 
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is 
usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without 
supervision; 
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation; 
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, 
and the place of work for the person doing the work; 
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed; 
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; 
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer; 
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of master and 
servant; and 
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business. 
Id. 
 154 Id. § 220(1) (emphasis added). 
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section 220 further describes the requisite control an employing entity must 
possess in order to be considered a “master” or, in layman’s terms, an 
employer: “Although control or right to control . . . is important and in many 
situations is determinative, . . . [it] may be very attenuated.”155 In some 
instances, an employment relationship may still exist even if there is “an 
understanding that the employer shall not exercise control.”156 In summary, 
under section 220 of the Second Restatement, a master–servant relationship 
may still exist even if a putative employer’s right to control is removed or the 
putative employer has specifically agreed not to actually exercise any control 
over the employees at issue. An employment relationship may still be found as 
long as the putative employer’s right to control is over the manner and means 
by which the employees complete their services, rather than simply the results 
of their services.157 
This understanding of the common law of agency is also consistent with 
the Third Restatement’s updated description of employee–employer 
relationships. The Third Restatement was adopted in 2006 to account for 
developments in the law of agency that occurred during the fifty-plus years 
after the Second Restatement’s publication.158 In the introduction of the Third 
Restatement, the editors noted that the common law of agency has “retained 
structural coherence” since the Second Restatement’s publication.159  
The Third Restatement of Agency retains a definition of “employee” in 
section 7.07(3) that is comparable to the Second Restatement: “[A]n employee 
is an agent whose principal controls or has the right to control the manner and 
means of the agent’s performance of work.”160 Similarly, the Third 
                                                                                                                     
 155 Id. § 220(1) cmt. d. 
 156 Id. (emphasis added). As an example, a full-time cook may be considered an 
employee even if the employer agrees that it will exercise no control over the menu or 
cooking decisions. Id.  
 157 Id. § 220(1) cmt. e (“An agent who is not subject to control as to the manner in 
which he performs the acts that constitute the execution of his agency is in a similar 
relation to the principal as to such conduct as one who agrees only to accomplish mere 
physical results. For the purpose of determining liability, they are both ‘independent 
contractors’ . . . .”). 
 158 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY foreword (AM. LAW INST. 2006). In publishing 
the Third Restatement of Agency, the editors aimed to “restate the law of Agency in the 
context of important statutes that influence court-made law, are influenced by the common 
law of agency, and are interpreted in light of common-law doctrine.” Id. 
 159 Id. intro. 
 160 Id. § 7.07(3) (emphasis added). The factors a court should consider in determining 
whether an employee–employer relationship exists, or whether the putative employee is 
merely an independent contractor, are described in comment (f):  
[T]he extent of control that the agent and the principal have agreed the principal may 
exercise over details of the work; whether the agent is engaged in a distinct occupation 
or business; whether the type of work done by the agent is customarily done under a 
principal’s direction or without supervision; the skill required in the agent’s 
occupation; whether the agent or the principal supplies the tools and other 
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Restatement also explains that “[i]n some employment relationships, an 
employer’s right of control may be attenuated . . . . Nonetheless, all employers 
retain a right of control, however infrequently exercised.”161 
The explicit language of the Second and Third Restatements establishes 
that a putative employer’s exercised control, as well as the potential to 
exercise control, over a group of employees can establish an employee–
employer relationship.162 Although the NLRB may not have recognized more 
attenuated, indirect employment relationships under its prior standard, that 
does not in itself render the Browning-Ferris joint-employer standard an 
unlawful exercise of agency discretion.163 The control required to qualify as a 
joint employer under the Browning-Ferris standard is still consistent with the 
common law of agency articulated by both the Second and Third 
Restatements.  
As for the Second Restatement, comment (d) of section 220 seems to 
specifically address arrangements in which the putative employer, or putative 
joint employer, retains only unexercised, contractual authority over an 
employee.164 Comment (d) contemplates an even further removed employment 
relationship than those recognized under the Browning-Ferris standard. It 
permits recognizing an employment relationship even if there was an explicit 
understanding between parties that a putative employer shall not exercise any 
                                                                                                                     
instrumentalities required for the work and the place in which to perform it; the length 
of time during which the agent is engaged by a principal; whether the agent is paid by 
the job or by the time worked; whether the agent’s work is part of the principal’s 
regular business; whether the principal and the agent believe that they are creating an 
employment relationship; and whether the principal is or is not in business. Also 
relevant is the extent of control that the principal has exercised in practice over the 
details of the agent’s work. 
Id. § 7.07 cmt. f. 
 161 Id. This comment also explicitly states that “[i]f a person has no right to control an 
actor and exercises no control over the actor, the actor is not an agent,” implying that a 
putative employer need not actually exercise any control in order to qualify as an employer. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 162 See supra Part V.A. 
 163 See Harper, supra note 9, at 335–36 (“Admittedly, the common law right-to-control 
test need not be so rigidly applied. Although a number of lower courts have resisted any 
tendencies of the Board to look beyond the alleged employer’s direct control over the 
‘manner and means’ of the work and consider other factors that are more concerned with 
the actual economic position of the workers, the Supreme Court has suggested that the 
common law test is flexible and requires consideration of all factors of the workers’ 
relationship with the alleged employer.” (footnote omitted)). For further illustration that the 
common law test allows more flexibility in finding an employment relationship than what 
the NLRB’s previous thirty-year-old joint-employer standard allowed under TLI, Inc., 271 
N.L.R.B. 798, 798 (1984), and Laerco Transportation, 269 N.L.R.B. 324, 325 (1984), see 
NLRB v. United Insurance Co. of America, 390 U.S. 254, 258–60 (1968). 
 164 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(1) cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1958). 
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control over the putative employees.165 Although the “however infrequently 
exercised” language of comment (f) of section 7.07 of the Third Restatement 
could be read to imply that the right to control still must be actually exercised 
at some point, this reading would be inconsistent with the surrounding 
language of the Third Restatement.166 Comment (f) also states that the right to 
control “may be attenuated,” and seems to focus more on the existence of the 
right to control rather than its exercise.167 Although the extent of control that a 
putative employer has exercised over a set of employees has probative value in 
determining whether an employment relationship exists,168 neither the Second 
nor Third Restatement of Agency indicate that the putative employer must 
exercise direct and immediate control over the employees to qualify as their 
employer. This conclusion is especially compelling considering that the Third 
Restatement was printed in 2006, within the timeframe in which the NLRB 
was following its “direct and immediate control” standard.169 Thus, although 
the NLRB elected to apply a narrower joint-employer standard at that time, the 
Third Restatement acknowledged that the common law of agency could reach 
a wider span of relationships. 
2. A Broad, Flexible Understanding of the Common Law Is Consistent 
with the Purposes of the NLRA 
Although not dispositive, courts should also give weight to the fact that the 
NLRB’s new joint-employer standard is not only consistent with the common 
law of agency, but is also more aligned with the NLRA’s general purposes 
than the Board’s prior standard.170 As the majority in Browning-Ferris 
explained, its goal in shifting the joint-employer standard was to encourage 
fair bargaining and to ensure that strategic business models do not 
unnecessarily distort differences in power between employees and 
employers.171 Many of these strategic business models are arguably developed 
by businesses with the specific intent of avoiding collective-bargaining 
                                                                                                                     
 165 Id. (“Although control or right to control . . . is important and in many situations is 
determinative, . . . [it] may be very attenuated. . . . In some types of cases which involve 
persons customarily considered as servants, there may even be an understanding that the 
employer shall not exercise control.” (emphasis added)). 
 166 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 cmt. f. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. (“Also relevant is the extent of control that the principal has exercised in 
practice over the details of the agent’s work.” (emphasis added)). The language indicates 
that the extent of a putative employer’s exercise of control is merely one of many factors 
considered under the common law standard. See id. 
 169 See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text. 
 170 See NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 91 (1995) (recognizing the 
consistency of the NLRB’s interpretation of “employee” with the NLRA’s purposes as a 
factor in finding the interpretation permissible under the NLRA). 
 171 See supra notes 51–57 and accompanying text. 
252 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78:1 
obligations under the NLRA.172 Congress explicitly delegated to the Board the 
authority to fashion rules addressing developing issues in labor law based on 
the Board’s greater expertise compared to courts regarding employment 
relationship issues, and to do so in a manner consistent with the purposes of 
the NLRA.173 Thus, it seems appropriate that the Board would be entitled to 
deference in adjusting its rules in an area of labor law, such as determining 
employer or joint-employer status, in which the broad and flexible language of 
the NLRA and the common law of agency are already susceptible to misuse 
and inconsistent application.174  
Considering the congressional purposes in enacting the NLRA and in 
establishing the NLRB to regulate collective-bargaining relationships, along 
with the language of the Second and Third Restatements, the Browning-Ferris 
joint-employer standard falls safely within the bounds of the common law of 
agency and the Board’s legitimate rulemaking authority.175 The Browning-
Ferris majority provided a thorough, twenty-page analysis of why they 
believed it was appropriate and necessary for the Board to revise its joint-
employer standard.176 Although the Browning-Ferris standard is a departure 
from the Board’s precedent, it is a far stretch to describe the departure as 
unexplained. Therefore, the Board’s revised joint-employer standard is 
reasonable, and reviewing courts should afford it Chevron deference. 
                                                                                                                     
 172 Ruth Burdick, Principles of Agency Permit the NLRB to Consider Additional 
Factors of Entrepreneurial Independence and the Relative Dependence of Employees 
When Determining Independent Contractor Status Under Section 2(3), 15 HOFSTRA LAB. 
& EMP. L.J. 75, 79 (1997) (“Employers have strong economic incentives to classify 
workers as independent contractors because the definition relieves them of statutory 
obligations to contribute to Social Security, unemployment insurance, workers’ 
compensation, income tax withholding, and employee benefits.”). 
 173 See supra notes 106–09 and accompanying text. 
 174 Harper, supra note 9, at 337 (“The very flexibility of the [common law] approach, 
as reflected in the range of factors that it encompasses, makes it either unpredictable for 
both employers and unions or manipulable by employers who can control most of the 
factors without changing basic economic relationships, or both.”). Considering the 
flexibility allowed under the common law standard with the unfortunate trend of employer 
foul play, the NLRB’s new, more employee-friendly standard sensibly and permissibly 
reforms the joint-employer standard to be more consistent with the purposes of the Act. Id. 
 175 See 29 U.S.C. § 156 (2012). 
 176 Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, 2015 WL 5047768, at 
*1–2, *15–21 (Aug. 27, 2015). As a quick summary, the Board provided the following 
justifications for its decision to revisit its joint-employer standard: an aim to “put the 
Board’s joint-employer standard on a clearer and stronger analytical foundation,” to better 
“serve the [NLRA’s] policy of ‘encouraging the practice and procedure of collective 
bargaining,’” and to address shortcomings in the Board’s prior requirement of “direct and 
immediate” control, which unnecessarily narrowed the circumstances under which an 
employment relationship could be found in many contingent employment arrangements. Id. 
at *2, *18 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 151).  
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B. The Browning-Ferris Joint-Employer Standard Is Different than the 
Economic Realities Test 
Both the legislative history of the Taft–Hartley amendments and 
subsequent Supreme Court precedent are interpreted as rejecting the Hearst 
economic realities standard as appropriate for determining whether an 
employment relationship exists under the NLRA.177 As previously described, 
the Court has held that the “obvious purpose” of the Taft–Hartley amendments 
was to ensure that the Board applied traditional common law principles of 
agency when determining whether employment relationships exist, rather than 
the economic realities test, which is primarily driven by policy and economic 
considerations.178 The Court’s extreme deference to the NLRB in Hearst, 
without any articulated limits, seems to have been a significant motivating 
factor behind Congress’s decision to reject the Hearst economic realities 
standard.179 Several opponents of the Browning-Ferris joint-employer 
standard contend that the new standard is an ill-disguised attempt to reinstate 
the rejected Hearst economic realities standard.180 
Some scholars maintain that there are actually two economic realities tests. 
Although Congress rejected the Hearst economic realities test when the 
economic relationship of the involved parties was a controlling and separate 
consideration from the control test, these scholars argue that an economic 
realities test that is incorporated as part of the control test is still permissible 
under the common law of agency.181 In Hearst, the economic reality of the 
                                                                                                                     
 177 See supra Part IV (discussing the reasoning behind, and the impact of, the Taft–
Hartley amendments to the NLRA). 
 178 NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968); see also supra Part IV. 
 179 H.R. REP. NO. 80-245, at 18 (1947) (“It is inconceivable that Congress, when it 
passed the act, authorized the [NLRB] to give to every word in the act whatever meaning it 
wished. On the contrary, Congress intended then, and it intends now, that the Board give to 
words, not far-fetched meanings but ordinary meanings.”). In a report released the same 
year as the Taft–Hartley amendments, Congress described the previous Hearst Court’s 
reliance on the NLRB’s expertise as “misplaced.” Id. 
 180 Browning-Ferris, 2015 WL 5047768, pt. III.A (Members Miscimarra & Johnson, 
dissenting) (“Accordingly, the inescapable conclusion to be drawn from the Taft-Hartley 
legislation repudiating the Hearst opinion is that Congress must have intended that 
common-law agency principles, rather than the majority’s much more expansive policy-
based economic realities and statutory purpose approach, here govern the definition of 
employer as well as employee under the Act.”); see also Ivan Osorio, NLRB’s BFI 
Decision Deserves Overturning, COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INST. (Sept. 9, 2015), 
https://cei.org/blog/nlrbs-bfi-decision-deserves-overturning?page=1 [https://perma.cc/2CU 
8-JC5N] (“[T]he majority appears to be reviving an old joint employer standard set in the 
1944 Supreme Court decision NLRB v. Hearst Publications that has since been rejected by 
Congress.”). 
 181 See, e.g., Thomas M. Murray, Note, Independent Contractor or Employee? 
Misplaced Reliance on Actual Control Has Disenfranchised Artistic Workers Under the 
National Labor Relations Act, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 303, 337–38 (1998). In his 
note, Murray describes how in both United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 712 (1947), and 
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employment relationship was the determinative factor, and the opinion 
explicitly stated that an employment relationship could be found under this 
standard even if such a finding was precluded under the common law 
standard.182 It was this divergent and far-reaching view of the employment 
relationship that Congress explicitly rejected through the Taft–Hartley 
amendments, not a narrower standard that considers economic realities but is 
still controlled by the common law of agency.183 Allowing some consideration 
of the economic realities of an employment relationship within the control test 
is consistent with both the factors identified as appropriate for consideration 
under the common law of agency as well as the NLRA’s broad definition of 
employer.184 This understanding of the Taft–Hartley amendments also allows 
the Board an appropriate level of flexibility to adjust its employer and joint-
employer standards to meet current legal and economic demands, as Congress 
predicted the Board would need when originally delegating its rulemaking 
authority.185 
Thus, although it can be argued that the Browning-Ferris joint-employer 
standard may tangentially consider the economic reality of the relationship 
between a putative joint employer and the employees at issue in determining 
whether a joint-employment relationship exists, this does not necessarily 
render the standard an unlawful exercise of agency discretion. As 
demonstrated by the Board’s application of the standard, a putative employer’s 
indirect or unexercised right to control employees is but one consideration in 
                                                                                                                     
Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947), the Supreme Court stressed “that overall 
economic realities must be examined in determining employee status.” Id. (emphasis 
added). Although these cases did not directly involve the NLRA, they were decided just ten 
days after Hearst and Congress believed them, at the time, to be consistent with the 
common law of agency. See id. at 313–16, 313 n.64; see also S. REP. NO. 80-1255, at 2 
(1948). As Murray explains, subsequent NLRB and circuit court decisions misinterpreted 
Congress’ intent in enacting the Taft–Hartley amendments and, therefore, applied the 
common law of agency control test in an overly narrow manner. Murray, supra, at 337–38. 
In enacting the Taft–Hartley amendments, “Congress said, ‘[d]on’t be fooled or unduly 
influenced by the form of the arrangement to which you must apply’ the control test.” Id. at 
337 (alteration in original) (quoting S. REP. NO. 80-1255, at 17). Thus, under this view, 
although the economic realities of the relationship between an employee and a putative 
employer should not be given dispositive weight under the common law of agency, it may, 
and should, be one factor considered. See id. at 337–38. 
 182 NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 127–29 (1944), overruled in part by 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992). 
 183 See discussion supra note 181. 
 184 See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2)–(3) (2012) (outlining the NLRA’s broad and open 
definitions of “employer” and “employee”); see also NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 
516 U.S. 85, 94 (1995). For a discussion of the factors of an employment relationship 
considered under the common law of agency, see supra Part V.A.1. 
 185 See 29 U.S.C. § 156; Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. 
Co., 387 U.S. 397, 416 (1967) (“Regulatory agencies . . . are supposed, within the limits of 
the law and of fair and prudent administration, to adapt their rules and practices to the 
Nation’s needs in a volatile, changing economy.”). 
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determining whether an employment relationship exists—it is not a sole or 
determinative factor.186 
C. The Browning-Ferris Standard Involves a Case-by-Case Analysis 
that Will Not Necessarily Result in Any Dramatic or Unjustified 
Economic Implications 
Joint-employer status determinations are an individualized, fact-specific 
inquiry into the totality of the relationships between a putative joint employer, 
its putative employees, and the employees’ direct employer.187 Both the 
Board’s prior joint-employer standard and its new standard require a 
multifactor test under which no one factor is determinative.188 The question is 
simply whether a putative joint employer maintains adequate control over the 
terms and conditions of a set of workers’ employment to make the entity’s 
presence at the bargaining table necessary to ensure meaningful bargaining 
between the interested parties.189  
Although the Browning-Ferris joint-employer standard can fairly be 
described as more expansive than its predecessor, there is currently little basis 
for many of the concerns about the decision’s potentially vast and 
overreaching economic implications. To date, the NLRB and its administrative 
judges seem to be applying the standard in a controlled and reasonable manner 
that is consistent with the common law of agency and the purposes of the 
NLRA.190 
                                                                                                                     
 186 Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, 2015 WL 5047768, at 
*18–21 (Aug. 27, 2015). In fact, in applying the test, the Board actually found that BFI had 
exercised control over the employees at issue of several occasions. Id. at *22 (“In many 
relevant respects, [BFI’s] right to control is indisputable. Moreover, it has exercised that 
control, both directly and indirectly.”). Thus, although the new standard could be 
interpreted in a manner that greatly expands the circumstances under which an employment 
relationship may be found, it need not be.  
 187 See, e.g., Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 481 (1964) (discussing how 
determining if a putative employer “possesse[s] sufficient indicia of control to be an 
‘employer’ is essentially a factual issue”); Carrier Corp. v. NLRB, 768 F.2d 778, 781 n.1 
(6th Cir. 1985) (“[B]ecause the joint employer issue is simply a factual determination, a 
slight difference between two cases might tilt a case toward a finding of a joint 
employment.”). Interestingly, in 1980 the Fifth Circuit explicitly stated that the existence 
of a joint-employer relationship is a factual issue that “depends on the control which one 
employer exercises, or potentially exercises, over the labor relations policy of the other.” 
N. Am. Soccer League v. NLRB, 613 F.2d 1379, 1381–82 (5th Cir. 1980) (emphasis 
added). 
 188 See supra Parts II, V.A.1. 
 189 See Browning-Ferris, 2015 WL 5047768, at *16 (“To best promote this policy, our 
joint-employer standard—to the extent permitted by the common law—should encompass 
the full range of employment relationships wherein meaningful collective bargaining is, in 
fact, possible.”). 
 190 See generally, e.g., Campaign for the Restoration and Regulation of Hemp, No. 19-
CA-143377, 2015 WL 9256882 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Dec. 17, 2015) (adopting a cease 
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Because the joint-employer standard is individualized and fact-specific, 
and because the Board has not had the opportunity to clarify the true breadth 
of its new standard, its actual impact is still unclear. Many of the business 
models that will be impacted by this development in labor law are those that 
have been improperly constructed for the purpose of avoiding collective 
bargaining and other obligations under the NLRA.191 It is unlikely that 
requiring these employers to participate in the collective-bargaining process 
with the workers from whom they reap a profit will greatly threaten the 
economic stability of the companies or of society.192 Rather, these enhanced 
obligations would be more faithful to the purposes of the NRLA and the 
redistributive goals of collective bargaining.193 
Therefore, reviewing courts should accord Chevron deference to the 
NLRB’s Browning-Ferris joint-employer standard. In applying the new 
standard, the Board will likely avoid any unnecessary or improper large-scale 
economic impacts without judicial intervention, while still promoting 
collective bargaining between workers and those having the requisite influence 
over the terms and conditions of their employment. The outcome suggested by 
this Note is not groundbreaking. It would be per-the-usual for appellate courts 
to defer to the Board’s judgment on this labor law matter, as has been the 
result in the vast majority of Board cases that have come under appellate court 
review in the past half century.194 
                                                                                                                     
and desist order). In this case, the NLRB administrative law judge found a joint-employer 
relationship existed because the two entities “share[d] or codetermine[d] those matters 
governing the essential terms and conditions of employment.” Id. (quoting Browning-
Ferris, 2015 WL 5047768, at *13). Here, as will be true in many cases, the NLRB judge 
did not need to address whether the putative joint employer’s indirect or unexercised 
authority to control workers was significant enough to qualify as an employer because the 
putative employer possessed, and had exercised, direct control over the workers. See id. In 
fact, the putative joint employer’s control over the workers was so substantial in this case 
that the NLRB judge found that the three joint employers at issue were really one, sole 
employer. Id. 
 191 See Harper, supra note 9, at 333 (discussing how experience demonstrates that 
employers “will look for any available routes to escape collective bargaining obligations 
that threaten the maximization of profits,” even routes that “clearly upset” the NLRA’s 
redistributive goals). 
 192 See id. 
 193 See id. at 331 (“The NLRA, therefore, was framed to allow workers to join together 
in an attempt to increase their wages through collective bargaining with the parties who are 
the primary beneficiaries of their work, namely the providers of the capital that their labor 
helps make productive. Only such capital providers have both the potential interest and the 
potential ability to offer enhanced wages.” (footnote omitted)). 
 194 Appellate Court Decisions, 1974-2016, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/news-
outreach/graphs-data/litigations/appellate-court-decisions-1974-2016 [https://perma.cc/7T7 
S-NN7E] (providing data regarding the number of NLRB cases appellate courts have 
heard, enforced in full, enforced with modifications or partially remanded, and total losses 
from 1974 through 2016). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
In August 2015, the NLRB expanded the circumstances under which an 
entity may qualify as a joint employer under the NLRA, departing from its 
thirty-year-old precedent requiring that a joint employer actually exercise 
direct and substantial control over its employees. In Browning-Ferris, the 
Board broadened its joint-employer standard to include those entities having 
significant but indirect or unexercised control over workers.195 The shift was 
motivated by the Board’s concern that the old standard unwarrantedly allowed 
companies to shield themselves from the NLRA’s collective-bargaining 
obligations through calculated business practices, exposing many workers to 
job and wage insecurity.196 The Board’s new standard requires that all parties 
suitable for meaningful negotiations over the terms and conditions of workers’ 
employment be represented at the collective-bargaining table.197 
The Board’s sudden departure from its own well-established precedent has 
raised concerns that businesses might be exposed to unexpected liability and 
obligations under the NLRA, resulting in unnecessary and unplanned 
expenses.198 Critics have also contended that because the business community 
has planned according to, and developed with, the old joint-employer standard, 
the new standard might significantly and adversely impact franchisee and 
supplier firm business models.199 Because of the increasing prominence of 
these business models, there is likewise apprehension about the impact this 
new standard might have on the economy as a whole.200 
However, although the Browning-Ferris decision expanded the 
circumstances under which a joint-employer relationship can be found, it did 
so within the permissible bounds of the authority that Congress has delegated 
to the NLRB. Congress has commanded that the Board determine joint-
employer status under standards consistent with the common law of agency.201 
Although admittedly broader than its prior standard, the Board’s new standard 
is still consistent with the common law of agency as articulated in both the 
Second and Third Restatements of Agency. The Board’s new standard also 
faithfully furthers the purposes of the NLRA: encouraging meaningful 
collective bargaining between workers and those entities making decisions 
about the terms and conditions of their employment. 
Therefore, under traditional standards of judicial review, courts should 
defer to the NLRB’s experience and expertise as expressed in the Browning-
Ferris joint-employer standard. The standard is consistent with both the 
Board’s rulemaking authority under the NLRA as well as the common law of 
                                                                                                                     
 195 See supra Part II.B. 
 196 See supra notes 51–54 and accompanying text. 
 197 See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text. 
 198 See supra notes 20–23 and accompanying text. 
 199 See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 200 See supra notes 20–23 and accompanying text. 
 201 See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
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agency. If the Board’s new joint-employer standard has any unwanted or 
adverse consequences, it remains within Congress’s province, not the courts’, 
to adjust the NLRA to reflect its desired standard or otherwise limit the 
NLRB’s rulemaking authority.202 
                                                                                                                     
 202 Such a bill was proposed soon after the Browning-Ferris decision. Protecting Local 
Business Opportunity Act, H.R. 3459, 114th Cong. (2015). 
